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The text deconstructs notions of ideal community which, while affinning 
irmnediate proximate human relations, effectiveiy disaffirms and thus 
devalues those mediated over distance and time. It argues against such 
social ontologies as the basis of what should constitute ideal consociality. 
In place of the idealized notions of community critiqued, the work elaborates 
an ontological ethics of responsibility as a basis for conceptualizing ethical 
relations. 
The text grounds its ethic in what is proffered to be humankind's ontological 
relatedness to the other, regardless of the nature (human or nonhuman) or 
proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that other. Moreover, the text 
sets forth the importance of humankind developing a sense of this 
ontological relatedness. The work discusses this sense-of-relatedness from 
three perspectives. First, it elaborates a philosophic naturalism to establish in 
humankind an ontological basis for ethical relations. Second, it claims that 
humankind is in the world, existentially, who and what it understands itself 
to be with respect to the depth with which it apprehends a sense of its 
ontological relatedness to all that there is. Third, it argues that this sense-of-
relatedness may be understood as a religious sensibility. 
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Introduction 
Radical social theorists often appeal to idealized notions of conununity 
which privilege face-to-face, unmediated social relations. They argue that 
development of such an "ideal" conununity can provide the basis for an 
ethical society. These communitarian social theorists see in these notions of 
conununity the requisite alternative to the oppression and exploitation which 
characterize western culture's capitalist patriarchal society. 
This work takes issue with these notions of conununity and their claim to 
be the basis for developing an ethical society. The architects of such 
concepts of conununity tend to overlook the relevance of, if not exclude 
altogether, mediated nonface-to-face relations. I will in this work 
deconstruct such notions of "true" conununity. My critique will emphasize 
the extent to which these conceptualizations diminish the significance of 
nonface-to-face, distant relations mediated through space and time. I will 
argue that notions of community which affirm immediate proximate human 
relations, while effectively disaffirming those mediated through distance and 
temporality, cannot provide the basis of what should constitute ideal 
consociality. Furthermore, I will argue that these notions of conununity are, 
in and of themselves, quite inadequate to establish the basis for an ethical 
society. I contend that if we are ever to develop an ethical society composed 
of communities, we will need first to establish in humanity, itself, an 
intrinsic, fundamental justification for acting ethically towards others. To 
this end I put forth in this work a dialectical ontology which centers ethics in 
the development of consciousness in the cosmos and consequent response-
ability in nature. Through this dialectic I develop an ethics of responsibility 
which, by the very nature of the human ontology conceptualized, rejects as 
inadequate the notions of community deconstructed in this text. Moreover, I 
ground this human ethics, in what I propose to be humanity's ontological 
relatedness to the other, regardless of the nature (human or nonhuman) or 
proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that other. 
Appeals to the notion of community often do not explicitly articulate the 
precise meaning of this concept of human relations. Even more rarely do 
those who invoke this terminology inquire into what it presupposes or 
implies, conceptually, or what it means concretely to institute a society that 
embodies "community." The work which follows deconstructs the meaning 
and implications of this idealized notion of an ethical culture. Yet, consistent 
with deconstructive criticism, it prescribes no alternative view of community. 
Rather, the work maintains that no view of community, irrespective of its 
conceptualization, will, in and of itself, be adequate to effect an ethical 
society. The work puts forth the premise that humankind will achieve neither 
the community it seeks, nor the ethical society it believes derives from it, 
without prior consideration of what the author believes are two preemptive 
criteria for ethical human relations. First, there must be established in 
humanity a fundamental and concrete basis for engaging in ethical relations. 
Second, humankind (individually as humans and collectively as society) must 
develop a sense of that basis for ethical relations. 
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The paper criticizes the aforementioned conceptualizations of community 
on both philosophical and ethical grounds. It argues that this idealized social 
ontology participates in what Derrida and Adorno call the metaphysics of 
presence--the logic of identity. The text contends that the metaphysics against 
which these writers argue denigrates the integrity of, and respect for, 
difference, diversity and distance in society. 
A notion of community which privileges face-to-face social relations, in 
disregard of others whose faces are not proximately present, falsely presumes 
that subjects can understand one another as they understand themselves. This 
presupposition denies the integrity of diversity and heterogeneity in the 
context of intersubjective relations. Moreover, the yearning for such 
community relies on the same desire for social oneness and identity in society 
that undergirds ethnic chauvinism, political sectarianism, and racism. 
Insofar as the notion of an ethical society entails promoting a model of 
face-to-face relations (to the exclusion of nonface-to-face relations) as a social 
ideal, it devalues temporal and spatial distance. A society that conceptualizes 
proximal, unmediated face-to-face relations as the ideal of social consociation 
is falsely conceived as "ideal" in several ways. First, it fails to recognize that, 
absent a fundamental and concrete basis in humankind for establishing ethical 
relations, alienation and diremption occur not only in mediated, distant social 
relations but can and do exist in immediate face-to-face relationships. Second, 
it fails to address ethics with respect to the social and political relations 
between those proximately relating face-to-face communities which are not, of 
necessity, proximate or face-to-face with all others. 
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The text completes its deconstruction of the idealized notions of 
community discussed by demonstrating that such conceptualizations totalize 
and detemporalize its conception of social life. This vestige of modernity 
sets up a dichotomy which poorly conceives the dialectic between 
"authentic" and "inauthentic" social relations. Such notions detemporalize 
their understanding of social change by positing the "authentic" society as 
the categorical and unequivocal negation of existing society. These idealized 
notions of community thus provide no understanding of the move from what 
is in the world to what should (and perhaps) could be. The text claims that 
the transition from here to there is rooted in a dialectical, developmental 
understanding of the contradictions and potentialities latent in existing 
society. 
In place of the idealized notions of community critiqued, the work 
elaborates an eductive dialectic to develop an ontological ethics of 
responsibility to and with the other as a basis for conceptualizing ethical 
relations in society. The dialectical thinking employed aims to articulate the 
inherent logic of an entity's or phenomenon's development--the point from 
whence it came, its current status, and where by its immanent developmental 
logic it should proceed. 
The text situates its ground for ethics in what the author calls a sense of 
ontological relatedness. The work discusses this sense-of relatedness from 
three perspectives. First, it elaborates a philosophic naturalism to establish in 
humankind an ontological basis for ethical relations. Second, it claims that 
humankind is in the world, existentially, who and what it understands itself 
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to be with respect to the depth with which it apprehends a sense of its 
ontological relatedness to all that there is. Third, it argues that this sense-of-
relatedness may be understood as a religious sensibility. 
The work utilizes dialectical reasoning to assert that humanity is 
developmentally related to all that there is in the cosmos. It argues that the 
development of human consciousness in the cosmos implies the emergence 
in nature of a 'response-ability' to be self-determining (and thus free) with 
respect to its own natural and social evolution. The text contends that 
because this ability to respond in nature is manifest in human nature, nature 
rendered self-conscious has an ontological responsibility to the other. The 
work explains how our response-ability means humans have a fundamental 
responsibility to be in the world in ways that foster (rather than impede) 
natural and social evolution. It is a responsibility to actualize the latent, but 
no less real, potentialities in nature for self-realization and thus freedom 
(self-determination). 
If nature rendered self-conscious is to actualize the potentialities for what 
should (and could) be in the world, the work argues that it must strive to 
effect natural and social well-being with respect to all others in its human 
and nonhuman relations. To this end, a depth apprehension of reality with 
respect to who and what human nature understands itself to be (individually 
as humans and collectively as society) must be brought to self- and social-
consciousness, respectively. The naturalistic argument is completed by 
demonstrating the dialectical relationship between humankind's self-
conscious ability to respond and its relatedness-based responsibility to 
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engage in ethical relations. The work contends that a sense of ontological 
relatedness to all others must become in nature rendered self-conscious an 
appreciation for, and existential embodiment of, human nature's 
responsibility to all others. Moreover, it asserts that this responsibility 
exists irrespective of the context of that relatedness, whether as human-to-
human, human-to-nonhuman, face-to-face, or nonface-to-face. 
After establishing a philosophical basis for ethical relations in humanity, 
as well as the need for humankind to become consciously aware of and 
embody a sense-of-relatedness to all that there is in the cosmos, the text 
turns its attention to the religious dimension of the author's argument. In 
this regard the work of the nineteenth century philosopher of religion, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, is pivotal. In what is a phenomenological 
consideration of the nature of the self, Schleiermacher advances the thought 
that the self is an immediate connectedness to that which is more than the 
self but not heteronymous to the self. The work suggests that such a 
conceptualization of the self-in-relation may be interpreted as an articulation 
of a sense of ontological relatedness to all that there is in the cosmos, 
including that which is experienced as more than but not separate from the 
self, which Schleiermacher called--God. 
The text completes the final argument in the thesis by moving beyond 
Schleiermacher's conceptualization of the self-in-relation. The idea is 
advanced that the developmental notion of humankind's natural ontological 
relatedness to and with all that there is in the cosmos, is an ethical ground for 
conceptualizing not only human and nonhuman nature, but Schleiermacher's 
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God, as intrinsically a part of who and what we are. If such a 
conceptualization is valid, the text concludes, then two things may be 
inferred. First, irrespective of how we conceptualize the notion of 
community, (human) nature rendered self-conscious will actualize its 
potentialities for self-realization and freedom only to the extent that it more 
deeply apprehends a sense of its ontological relatedness to all that there is in 
the cosmos--including that which is more than the self, but not separate from 
the self. Second, this sense-of-relatedness which binds us ethically to each 
other and the world can be understood as a religious sensibility. 
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Chapter 1: Deconstructing the Logic of Identity 
Western conceptualization of thought, as expressed both in philosophical and 
other theoretical writing, as well as frequently in everyday speech, exhibits 
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what Jacques Derrida calls a "metaphysics of presence," a "logic of identity." 
Derrida understands this conceptualization to be a metaphysics in that it 
consists in a desire to think things together as a unity, to formulate a 
representation of a whole, a totality~ This metaphysics seeks the unity of the 
thinking subject with the object thought, such that conceptually grasping the 
object would be a grasping of the real~ The desiderata for unity seeks to think 
everything that is as a whole. It endeavors to describe even existential 
ontologies within society, such as social and political relations, as a totality, a 
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whole, a system. Furthermore, such totalization need not be circumscribed 
within the context of synchronic conceptualization. A teleological 
conceptualization of a process likewise exhibits the logic of identity, 
inasmuch as the end conceptually organizes the process into a unity.5 
The desire to bring things into unity, notes Derrida, generates a logic of 
hierarchical opposition. The move to define an identity, a closed totality, 
always depends on excluding some elements; it separates that which is 
construed to be in (the pure) from that which is construed to be out (the 
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impure). Both Derrida and Adorno contend that to bring particular things 
under a universal essence, for example, depends on determining some 
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attribute of particulars as accidental, lying outside the essence (the pure). 
Any definition or category creates an inside-outside dichotomy; and the logic 
8 
8 
of identity seeks to maintain those borders firmly established. The 
metaphysics of presence has in the history of Western thought generated a 
significant number of mutually exclusive, dichotomous oppositions; 
moreover, these dyads (subject-object, mind-body, culture-nature, male-
female, etc.) have provided the foundation for entire philosophies. 9 In this 
metaphysical tradition the first of these terms is elevated and thus valued over 
the second; it designates that which it understands to be rational, irrational, 
over, under, above, below, superior, inferior. 10 Western metaphysical 
thinking makes distinctions and formulates representations by relying on such 
dichotomies. In this regard one side designates that which is valued--the 
pure, authentic, good. While the other delineates that which is devalued--the 
. . h . bad 11 impure, maut entJc, . 
The logic of identity attempts to understand the subject, the individual, as 
a self-identical unity.12 Modem philosophy, beginning with Descartes, is 
particularly preoccupied with the unity of consciousness and its immediate 
presence to itself.13 The tradition of transcendental philosophy from 
Descartes through Kant to Husserl conceives the subject as both a unity and 
an origin. Furthermore, it conceives it as the self-same starting point of 
thought and meaning, whose signification is never beyond its grasp.14 
There are two types of criticisms in which Derrida, Adorno, Julia 
Kristeva, and others engage with respect to the metaphysics of presence.15 
These critics contend that any effort by a logic of identity to bring things into 
unity is doomed from its inception. The claim to totality asserted by this 
metaphysics is incoherent; as was mentioned previously in this work, the 
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process of totalizing, itself, expels various aspects of the entities seeking 
identity.16 Some of the experienced particulars are expelled to an 
unaccounted-for, "accidental" realm. Derrida calls this region of exclusion 
the "supplement;" Adorno terms it the "addendum." 17 The effort to generate 
totality, as the logic of hierarchical opposition demonstrates, creates not 
unity, but dichotomy: inside and outside. The identity or essence sought 
receives its meaning and purity only through its relation with its outside.18 
Derrida's method of deconstruction, consists of illustrating how, with 
respect to a category or concept, what it may claim to exclude is actually 
implicated in it by virtue of what it claims not to be. Dialectical reasoning, 
of course, makes a similar claim. The method of deconstruction, or what 
Adorno calls negative dialectic, however, rejects the Hegelian method of 
dialectic.19 For Hegelian dialectic is itself modernity's epitome of a 
totalizing impulse; its logic brings the oppositions generated by 
metaphysical thought into ultimate unity within a totality.20 
A second criticism of the metaphysics of presence is that it represses or 
denies difference. 21 The latter expression has come to carry much meaning 
in the philosophical work of post-structuralists like Derrida. In the context 
in which Derrida and other post-structuralists use it, difference means the 
irreducible particularity of entities.22 This nonreductive nature of entities 
makes it impossible to reduce them to commonness or bring them into unity 
without remainder. Such particularity derives from the contextuality of 
existence; hence, the being of a thing and what is said about it is a function 
of its contextual relation to other things.23 
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Adorno in particular contrasts the logic of identity with entities in their 
particularity, which for him also means their materiality.24 Idealism, which 
Adorno believes exhibits the logic of identity, withdraws from such 
particularity and constructs unreal essences.25 
Derrida defines difference primarily in terms of the functioning of 
language. In this regard he expresses difference with respect to the 
irreducible spatiotemporality of language.26 The sign signifies, has meaning, 
by its place in the chain of signs, by differing from other signs. Any moment 
of signification also defers; it holds in abeyance, any completion of its 
meaning.27 Any utterance has a multiplicity of meanings and directions of 
interpretation and development in which it can be taken.28 For Derrida, the 
metaphysics of presence seeks to detemporalize and despatialize this 
signifying process. It thereby invents the illusion of pure present meaning 
which eliminates the referential relation.29 This conceptualization of pure 
present meaning is idealism: conceiving the being and truth of things as 
lying outside time and mutability .30 
Feminist theorist Julia Kristeva also deals with this issue of difference; 
however, she employs the term heterogeneity, rather than Derrida's 
linguistic construction, dijferance. 31 Like Derrida and Adorno, Kristeva 
contends that the logic of identity represses; it represses heterogeneity. She 
too draws attention to language and the process of signification, especially 
with respect to the speaking subject. Moreover, and going beyond Derrida 
and Adorno's linguistic emphasis, Kristeva associates heterogeneity with the 
body as well as language.32 
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The subject is never a unity, but always in process, for Kristeva. It is always 
producing meaning through the play between the literal and figurative, repre-
sentational and musical aspects that any speech simultaneously carries.33 
I concur with writers like Anthony Giddens and Fred Dallmayr.34 The 
deconstructive critique of the metaphysics of presence engaged in by 
Derrida, Adorno, Kristeva and others has important implications with respect 
to the philosophical underpinnings of our economic, political, and social 
relations. Moreover, the claim by these writers that we must attend to the 
irreducibility of difference in society has important implications for social-
political theory and practice.35 
I contend that the idealized notion of community discussed in this text 
exhibits the desire for unity that writers such as Giddens, Dallmayr and 
others find in the metaphysics of presence. Community usually appears as 
one side of a dichotomy in which individualism is the opposing pole. Yet, as 
with any such opposition, each side is determined by its relation to the 
other.36 I argue herein that the idealized notion of community presented in 
this work exhibits a totalizing impulse and denies difference or heterogeneity 
in three primary ways. First, it denies the difference within and between 
subjects. Second, in privileging face-to-face unmediated relations (to the 
veritable exclusion of nonface-to-face mediated relations) as a social ideal, it 
devalues temporal and spatial distancing within society. Third, in radically 
opposing as "inauthentic" the nonface-to-face social relations of alienated 
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society with the ostensibly "authentic" face-to-face social relations of 
community, it detemporalizes the process of social change. It creates a static 
before and after structure with no conceptualization of a way to get from 
here to there, from the irrational what is of existing society to what could 
and perhaps should be in a rational society. 
To this end of achieving what could and perhaps should be in society, I 
argue for the need to establish within the context of humankind (as nature 
rendered self-conscious) a philosophical underpinning for ethical human-to-
human (social) and human-to-nonhuman (ecological) relations in the world. 
In this regard I proffer an understanding of ethics that is both naturalistic and 
dialectical, centered in the development of consciousness in nature and 
response-ability in the cosmos. The naturalistic dialectic described 
articulates a basis for an ethics of human responsibility to and with the other, 
grounded in a sense of ontological relatedness to the other, irrespective of 
whether that other is human or face-to-face. 
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Chapter 2: A Dichotomy: Community/Individualism 
Critics of Western liberalism frequently invoke a conception of community 
which projects an alternative to the individualism and abstract formalism 
they attribute to liberal thought.37 The alternative social ontology which they 
put forth rejects the notion that persons are separate, self-contained, whole 
discreet entities. Moreover, it repudiates the liberal premise that these 
allegedly autonomous entities each have the same formal rights--the right to 
exclude and keep others out, separate.38 The critics of liberalism find, in 
their idea of community, a social ontology which sees the attributes of a 
person as contemporaneous with the society in which he or she lives. 
For such writers, the notion of the ideal ethical society evokes the 
absence of the self-interested competitiveness of modem capitalist society.39 
In this idealized notion of community, critics of Western liberalism find an 
alternative to the abstract, formal methodology of modem liberalism. 
Existing in community with others, they suggest, entails more than merely 
respecting their rights; rather it involves attending to and sharing in the 
particularity of their needs, interests, and desires.40 
In his critique of liberal social justice theorist, John Rawls, 
communitarian Michael Sandel argues that liberalism's emphasis on the 
primacy of justice presupposes a self as an antecedent unity; moreover, he 
contends that such a 'liberal' self exists prior to its desires and goals, whole 
unto itself, separated and bounded.41 The Rawlian perspective, Sandel 
argues, is unreal and incoherent as a conceptualization of the self. It is better 
replaced, he contends, by a constitutive conception of self as the product of 
an identity it shares with others.42 
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And insofar as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a 
wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or a tribe 
or a city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a 
community in the constitutive sense. And what marks such a 
community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence 
of communitarian values, or even certain 'shared final ends' alone, 
but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit 
practices and understandings within which the opacity of persons is 
reduced if never finally dissolved. Insofar as justice depends for its 
preeminence on the separateness and boundedness of persons in the 
cognitive sense, its priority would diminish as that opacity faded and 
those community values deepened.43 
In contemporary political discourse, for the most part, the notion of the 
idealized community arises in this manner as a response to the individualism 
perceived as the prevailing theoretical position. It arises as well as a result of 
the alienation and fragmentation perceived as the prevailing concrete 
condition of society.44 Community so understood appears as one-half of an 
oppositional dichotomy: individualism-community, separated self-shared 
self.45 In this opposition each term comes to be defined by its negative 
relation to the other, thus existing in a logical dependency. I suggest, 
however, that this dichotomous opposition is integral to modem political and 
social theory; it is not, I contend, an alternative to it. 
The dichotomy, individualism-community, receives one of its expressions 
in bourgeois culture via the socially constructed opposition between 
masculinity and femininity. Western culture identifies masculinity with the 
values associated with individualism: self-sufficiency, competition, 
separation, the formal equality of rights.46 The culture identifies femininity, 
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on the other hand, with the values associated with community: affective 
relations of care, mutual aid, and cooperation.47 Psychologist Carol Gilligan 
has in the past decade posed this opposition between masculine and feminine 
in terms of the opposition between two orientations on moral reasoning.48 
The "ethic of rights" that Gilligan takes to be typical of masculine thought 
emphasizes the separation of selves and the sense of fair play necessary to 
mediate the competition among such separated selves. The "ethic of care," 
on the other hand, which she takes to be typical of feminine thinking, 
emphasizes relatedness among persons; it is an ethic of sympathy and 
affective attention to particular needs, rather than formal measuring of each 
according to universal rules.49 Gilligan's ethic of care thus articulates one-
half of a socially constructed dichotomy. It expresses the relationality of the 
idealized notion of community as opposed to the atomistic formalism of 
liberal individualism. 
The opposition between individualism and community, then, is 
homologous with and often implies the oppositional dichotomies masculine-
feminine, public-private, calculative-affective, instrumental-aesthetic. 
Moreover, these dualities are typically present in modem social and political 
thought.50 This binary thinking has always valued the first term in these 
oppositions more highly than the second.51 In addition it has provided them 
with a dominant institutional expression in society.52 For that reason 
asserting the value of community over individualism, the feminine over the 
masculine, the aesthetic over the instrumental, the relational over the 
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competitive, does have some critical force with respect to the dominant 
ideology and its attendant social relations. The oppositions themselves, 
however, arise from and belong to bourgeois culture. For this reason merely 
reversing their valuation does not constitute a genuine alternative to 
'ta)' . ha! . 53 cap1 1st patnarc society. 
Like most oppositional dichotomies, individualism and community have 
a common logic underlying their polarity. As Derrida and others have 
demonstrated, this shared denominator makes it possible for them to define 
each other negatively. Each entails a denial of difference as well as a desire 
to bring multiplicity and heterogeneity into unity, although in opposing 
ways. Liberal individualism denies difference by positing the self as an 
autonomous, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or in need of anything or 
anyone other than itself.54 Its formalistic ethic of rights denies difference by 
leveling all such separated individuals under a common measure of rights.55 
The idealized notion of community, on the other hand, denies difference by 
positing fusion rather than separation as the social ideaI.56 Community 
advocates conceive the social subject as a relation of unity composed by 
identification and symmetry among individuals within a totality. As Sandel 
puts it, the opacity of persons tends to dissolve as ends, vocabulary, and 
practices become identical.57 This orientation represents an impulse to 
visualize persons in unity with each other in a shared whole, a totality. 
As is the case with many dichotomies, in this one the possibilities for 
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social ontology and social relations appear to be exhausted in the two 
categories juxtaposed. For many writers, the rejection of individualism 
logically entails asserting community, and conversely any rejection of 
community means that one necessarily embraces liberal individualism. This 
tendency to default to one or the other position can be seen in the literature 
of the last couple of decades which deals with social and political theory. 
The debate which ensued between social theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain and 
socialist writer Barbara Ehrenreich with respect to individualism and 
community is instructive.58 In their discussion about this debate, Sara Evans 
and Harry Boyte claim that Ehrenreich promotes individualism because she 
rejects the appeal to community that Elshtain makes.59 The plausibility of 
the idea that there could be other constructions of social organization is not 
even conceptualized. For Evans and Boyte, all possibilities have been 
reduced by binary thought to the mutually exclusive dichotomous opposition 
between individualism and community. 
For many radical social theorists, however, the thorough-going 
opposition of individualism and community has begun to deteriorate~ 
Contrary to reactionary appeals to community which consistently assert the 
subordination of individual aims and values to the collective, many radical 
theorists assert otherwise. They contend that community itself consists in 
the respect for and fulfillment of individual aims and capacities. The 
modem distinction between individualism and community thus gives way to 
a dialectic in which each becomes a necessary condition for the other. 
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Chapter 3: Difference Devalued: Subjects 
In her interpretation of Marx's ontology, social theorist Carol Gould 
formulates a conception of community that is dialectical. In it she treats 
community as the transcended synthesis of both sociality and individuality .61 
This ideal society of the future is realized as the third stage of a process of 
social evolution. The first stage is a communal society in which the 
individual is subjected to the collective, and the second is the individualist 
society of capitalist alienation. Gould comments: 
The separate subjects who are related to each other only as objects, 
namely, as beings for another, now recognize themselves. 
Therefore they recognize each other as subjects, and the unity 
between subjects and objects is reestablished in this recognition. 
The subjects are then related to each other not as alien external 
others, but as aspects of a common species subject. The relations 
are therefore internal, since they are the interrelations within this 
common or communal subject which is now no longer made up of 
discrete individuals in external relations, but rather of individuals 
who are unified in their common subjectivity .... The subjects are 
therefore mutually interdependent and the relations between them 
are internal because each subject is what it is--a subject--through its 
relation to the other, namely, through being recognized as a subject 
by the other. These individuals therefore form a communal but 
differentiated subject that expresses itself in and through each 
individual. The whole or unity that is reconstituted in these internal 
relations among the individuals is thus mediated or differentiated by 
their individuality, but unified by their commonality.62 
According to Derrida, dialectical logic like Gould's represses difference. 
Yet it does so not by bringing multiplicity under a simple universal; rather it 
puts closure on the process of exteriorization.63 This closure emerges in the 
concept of a whole or totality within which opposites (differences) are 
reconciled and balanced.64 
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Like many other expressions of this ideal of community, Gould's conception 
of community functions through a totalizing desire to reconcile the 
differences of subjects. 
The communitarian ideal participates in the metaphysics of presence 
because it conceives that subjects no longer need be exterior to one another. 65 
They need no longer outrun one another in directions they do not mutually 
understand and affirm. Moreover, the ideal extends this mutuality to its 
conception of the ethical society as a telos, an end to the conflict and 
violence of human interaction. Community, in this instance, is conceived as 
a totality in two ways. It has no ontological exterior, since it realizes the 
unity of general will and individual subjectivity. Furthermore, it has no 
historical exterior, for there is no further stage to traverse.66 
While she does not specifically speak of her notion of social ideal as 
community, social theorist Seyla Benhabib expresses a similar ideal in the 
context of standpoint theory.67 In this conceptualization people relate to one 
another through reciprocal recognition of subjectivities as a particular 
standpoint of moral autonomy. Benhabib contends that liberalism holds a 
conceptualization of moral autonomy which she refers to as the "standpoint 
of the generalized other." Abstracting from the difference, desires and 
feeling among persons, the standpoint of the generalized other regards all as 
sharing a common set of formal rights and duties. In contradistinction to 
the latter notion, Benhabib puts forth a concept called the "standpoint of the 
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concrete other." This conceptualization views each person in his or her 
concrete individuality~ 
In assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what continues our 
commonality and seek to understand the other as he/she 
understands himself/herself. We seek to comprehend the needs of 
the other, their motivations, what they search for and what they 
desire. Our relations to the other is governed by the norm of 
complementary reciprocity: each is entitled to expect and assume 
from the other forms of behavior through which the other feels 
recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with 
specific needs, talents and capacities. Our differences in this case 
complement rather than exclude one another.69 
Benhabib' s notion of the standpoint of the concrete other expresses 
community as the mutual and reciprocal understanding of persons, relating 
internally, as Gould puts it, rather than externally. Many other writers 
express a similar ideal of relating to other persons internally, understanding 
them from their point of view.70 In a quotation by Michael Sandel cited 
previously, Sandel poses the elimination of the opacity of other persons as 
the ideal for community. 71 Isaac Balbus represents the aim of radical 
politics and the establishment of community as the overcoming of the 
"otherness" of other in reciprocal recognition.72 Roberto Unger articulates 
the ideal of community as the political alternative to personal love.73 In 
community persons relate to one another as concrete individuals who 
recognize themselves in each other because they have shared purposes. The 
conflict between the demands of individuality and the demands of sociability 
disappears in mutual sympathy.74 Dorothy Allison proposes an ideal of 
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community that is characterized by a "shared feeling of belonging and 
. " . h " . f ,,75 mergmg, wit an ecstatic sense o oneness. 
The formulations of consociality delineated above seek to understand 
community as a unification of particular persons through the sharing of 
subjectivities. With respect to these conceptions of community persons 
cease to be opaque, other and not understood; rather, they become fused, 
mutually sympathetic and allegedly understanding of one another as they 
understand themselves. Yet such an ideal of shared subjectivity, or the 
transparency of subjects to one another, denies difference in the sense of 
disregard for the basic asymmetry of subjects. As Hegel first brought into 
sharp relief and Sartre's analysis deepened, persons necessarily transcend 
each other because subjectivity is negativity .76 The regard of the other upon 
me is always objectifying. Other persons never see the world from my 
perspective; thus, I am always faced with an experience of myself I do not 
have in witnessing the other's objective grasp of my words, deeds and 
person. 
This mutual intersubjective transcendence, of course, makes sharing 
between people possible--a fact that Sartre notices less than Hegei.77 The 
sharing, however, is never complete mutual understanding and reciprocity. 
Moreover, sharing is fragile. The other person may at the next moment 
understand my words differently from the way I meant them or carry my 
actions to consequences I do not intend. The same difference that makes 
sharing between us possible also makes misunderstanding, rejection, 
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withdrawal, and conflict always possible conditions of social being. 
The notion that each person can understand the other as he or she 
understands himself or herself, or that we can know one another as subjects 
with respect to each other's concrete needs and desires, begins with certain 
presuppositions. First one must presuppose that a subject can know himself 
or herself; second, we must presume an ability to express that knowledge 
accurately and unambiguously to others. Such a concept of self-knowledge 
retains the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity basic to the modern 
metaphysics of presence.78 The idea of the self as a unified subject of desire 
and need, and an origin of assertion and action, has been persuasively called 
into question by contemporary philosophers.79 To explicate my 
understanding of this I will rely on the work of theorist Julia Kristeva.80 
Without elaborating the linguistic detail in which she couches her notion 
of the subject-in-process, I will summarize briefly the general idea of her 
argument. Kristeva relies on a psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious to 
assert that subjectivity is heterogeneous and decentered.81 Consciousness, 
meaning, and intention are only possible because the subject-in-process slips 
and surpasses its intentions and meanings. Any utterance, for example, not 
only has a literal meaning, but is laden with ambiguities. The latter are 
embodied in gesture, tone of voice, and rhythm which contribute to the 
heterogeneity of its meaning without being intended.82 The same is true 
with respect to actions and interactions with other persons. What I say and 
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do always has a multiplicity of meanings, ambiguities and plays, and these 
83 
are not always coherent. 
Since the subject is not a unity, it cannot be present to itself and know 
itself.84 We cannot always know what we mean, need, want or desire since 
these aspects of our subjectivity do not arise from some ego as origin. 
Often we express desire in gesture or tone of voice, without meaning to do 
so. Consciousness, speech, expressiveness are possible only if the subject 
always surpasses itself, and is thus necessarily unable to comprehend itself. 
Subjects all have multiple desires that do not cohere; they attach layers of 
meanings to objects without always being aware of each layer or their 
connections. Consequently, an individual subject is a play of differences--of 
signifiers--that cannot be comprehended.85 
If the subject is heterogeneous process, unable to be present to itself, then 
it logically follows that subjects cannot be themselves transparent; they 
cannot be wholly present to one another. If each subject, therefore, escapes 
its own comprehension and for that reason cannot fully express to another its 
needs and desires, then necessarily each subject also escapes sympathetic 
comprehension by others. One cannot understand another as that other 
understands himself or herself, because he or she does not completely 
understand himself or herself. Indeed, because other people's expression to 
me may outrun their own awareness or intention, I may understand certain 
aspects of them more fully than they. 
Gould appeals to the ideal of "shared subjectivity" as an alternative 
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to the commodification of persons she finds characteristic of capitalist 
domination. Her conceptualization suggests that only if persons 
understood one another "internally," as she puts it, would such domination 
be eliminated~6 With regard to her position, one should be clear. This 
thesis does not deny that current social relations in Western society are 
replete with domination and exploitation. Yet conceiving the elimination of 
these conditions in terms of an impossible ideal of shared subjectivity, as 
Gould does, can tend to deflect attention from more concrete analysis of, and 
action with respect to, the conditions of their elimination. 
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Chapter 4: Difference Devalued: Distance 
Many political theorists who put forward an ideal of community specify 
small-group, face-to-face relations as essential to the realization of that ideal. 
Peter Manicas expresses a version of the ideal of community that includes 
this face-to-face specification: 
Consider an association in which persons are in face-to-face 
contact, but where the relations of persons are not mediated by 
"authorities," sanctified rules, reified bureaucracies or 
commodities. Each is prepared to absorb the attitudes, reasoning 
and ideas of others and each is in a position to do so. Their 
relations, thus, are open, immediate and reciprocal. Further, the 
total conditions of their social lives are to be conjointly 
determined with each having an equal voice and equal power. 
When these conditions are satisfied and when as a result, the 
consequences and fruits of their associated and independent 
activities are perceived and consciously become an object of 
individual desire and effort, then there is a democratic 
community. 87 
Roberto Unger argues that community requires face-to-face interaction 
among members within a plurality of contexts. To understand other people 
and to be understood by them in our concrete individuality, we must not only 
work together but play together, take care of children together, grieve 
together, and so on. 88 Christian Bay envisions the ethical society as founded 
upon small face-to-face communities of direct democracy and multi-faceted 
interaction. 89 Michael Taylor specifies that in a community, relations 
among members must be direct and many-sided. Like Manicas, he asserts 
that relations are direct only when they are unmediated by representatives, 
leaders, bureaucrats, state institutions, or codes. 90 While Gould does not 
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specify face-to-face relations as necessary, some of her language suggests 
that community can only be realized in such face-to-face relations. In the 
institutionalization of democratic socialisms, she says, "social combination 
now becomes the immediate subjective relations of mutuality among 
individuals. The relations again become personal relations as in the 
precapitalist stage, but no longer relations of domination and no longer 
mediated, as in the second stage, by external objects." 91 
There are several problems with the privileging of face-to-face relations 
by such theorists of community. This is especially so when it is done 
without consideration for, if not the veritable exclusion of, those nonface-to-
face others in the world distanced from us by space and time. Privileging 
social (human-to-human) and ecological (human-to-nonhuman) relations 
that are proximate to us, without considering these same types of relations 
that are more distant from us in space and time, is presumptuous in several 
ways. First, it presumes an illusory ideal of unmediated social relations; 
second, it wrongly identifies mediation with alienation. Moreover, 
privileging face-to-face relations to the detriment of nonface-to-face 
relations denies difference in the sense of time and space distancing. It 
implies a model of the ethical society as consisting only of proximately 
related, decentralized small units, which is both unrealistic and not 
necessarily desirable politically. The privileging of face-to-face, proximate 
relations avoids the sociopolitical question of the relations among the 
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decentralized communities consequent in this model. 
The advocates of community previously cited give primacy to face-to-
face presence because they claim that only under those conditions can social 
relations be immediate. In couching their expressions in terms of social 
relations that are immediate, I understand them to mean several things. First 
they are direct, personal relations, in which each understands the other in her 
or his individuality. This is an extension of the ideal of mutual 
understanding critiqued in Chapter 3. Second immediacy here also means 
relations of co-presence in which persons experience a simultaneity of 
speaking and hearing; moreover, they are in relatively the same space. In 
other words they have the possibility to move close enough to be in physical 
contact with one another. 92 
This ideal of the immediate presence of subjects to one another, however, 
is a metaphysical illusion. Even a face-to-face relation between two people 
is mediated by voice and gesture, spacing and temporality. As soon as a 
third person enters the interaction, the possibility arises of the relation 
between the first two being mediated through the third, and so on. The 
mediation of relations among persons by speech and actions of still other 
persons is a fundamental condition of sociality. The richness, creativity, 
diversity, and potential of a society expand with growth in the scope and 
means of its media, linking persons across time and distance. The greater 
the time and distance, however, the greater the number of persons who stand 
between other persons. 
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The nonnative privileging of face-to-face relations in the ideal of community 
seeks to suppress difference in the sense of the time and space distancing of 
social processes, which material media facilitate and enlarge. Such an ideal 
dematerializes its conception of interaction and institutions. For all social 
interaction takes place over time and across space. Social desire consists in 
the urge to carry meaning, agency, and the effects of agency beyond the 
moment and beyond the place. As laboring subjects we separate the moment 
of production from the moment of consumption. Even societies confined to 
a limited territory with few institutions and a small population devise means 
for their members to communicate with one another over distances. They 
devise means of maintaining their social relationships even though they are 
not geographically face-to-face. Societies occupy wider and wider 
territorial fields and increasingly differentiate their activity in space, time, 
and function. It is a movement that accelerates and takes on qualitatively 
specific form in modern industrial societies. 93 
1 submit that there are no conceptual grounds for considering face-to-face 
relations as more pure, authentic social relations than relations mediated 
across time and distance. For both face-to-face and nonface-to-face 
relations are mediated relations. In both there is as much the possibility of 
separation and violence as there is communication and consensus. Theorists 
of community are inclined to privilege face-to-face relations, it seems, 
because they wrongly identify mediation with alienation. I should at this 
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juncture clarify what I mean by alienation. The context in which I am using 
it here is Marxian. 
An extended concept of alienation has gained wide currency in twentieth-
century philosophy and social theory. Under converging influences from 
existentialism, the Frankfurt School, humanism and psychoanalysis, the term 
"alienation" has been used in numerous diagnoses of the maladies of 
something called "the modem world." Various alleged symptoms of 
"modernity" --the dichotomies of scientism and irrationalism, atheism and 
religiosity, individuality and community, intellect and feeling, masculine and 
feminine etc.--have been encompassed within theories of alienation. 
Yet, alienation is not supposed to be a catastrophe striking humanity from 
outside; it is essentially a perverted, malign, and self-destructive expression 
of human creativity itself. Alienation has come to mean that people are 
subject to oppression which is--though they may not recognize it--at least 
partially of their own making. 
The concept of alienation achieved popularity in the context of dialectical 
materialism--the philosophical interpretation of Marxism. In Marx's early 
writings, especially the 1844 Manuscripts, alienation was discussed as an 
explicit social phenomenon, empirically verifiable. He used the term to refer 
to the ways in which the human powers of perception, orientation, and 
creation necessarily become stunted and crippled by the very nature of the 
industrial organization and by the capitalist economic system. Marx felt that 
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human beings suffer from alienation to the extent that they do not realize the 
full potential of their being. 
With respect to my use of the term, alienation, it is Marxian in the sense 
that I believe humans do suffer alienation to the extent that we do not realize 
the full potential of what we could and perhaps should be. It is not, 
however, Marxist in that I advocate neither the teleological culmination of 
dialectical materialism generally, nor its determinist view specifically, that 
alienation as a necessary concomitant of capitalism can only be resolved 
through the "dictatorship of the proletariat." 
Alienation is a situation in which persons do not have control over their 
actions, the conditions of their action or the consequences of their action, 
due to the intervention of other agents.94 Social mediation is a condition 
for the possibility of alienation in this sense; media make possible the 
intervention of agents between the conditions of a subject's action and the 
action or between a subject's action and its consequences. Thus media make 
domination and exploitation possible. In modern society the primary 
structures creating alienation and domination are bureaucracy and 
commodification of all aspects of human activity, including and especially 
labor. Both bureaucracy and commodification of social relations depend 
on complex structures of mediation among a large number of persons. 
That mediation is a necessary condition of alienation, however, does not 
entail the reverse implication: That only by eliminating structures of 
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mediation do we eliminate alienation. If temporal and spatial distancing are 
basic to social processes, and if persons always mediate between other 
persons to generate social networks, then a society of immediacy is 
impossible. While mediation may be a necessary condition for alienation, it 
is not sufficient. Alienation is that specific process of mediation in which 
the actions of some serve the ends of others without reciprocation and 
without being explicit, and this requires coercion and domination. 
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Chapter 5: Beyond Dichotomies 
By positing a society of immediate face-to-face relations as ideal, 
community theorists generate a dichotomy between the "authentic" society 
of the future and the "inauthentic" society we live in. Moreover, they tend 
to characterize the latter by alienation, bureaucratization, and degradation. 95 
Such a dichotomization between the inauthentic society of today and the 
authentic society in which community prevails, however, detemporalizes our 
understanding of social change. On this understanding, social change and 
revolution consist in the complete negation of this existing society and the 
establishment of the truly ethical society. In her scheme of social evolution, 
Gould conceives of "the society of the future" as the negated sublation of 
capitalist society. This orientation understands history not as a 
developmental temporal process, but as divided into two static structures: the 
before of alienated society and the after of community. 96 
The projection of the ideal of community as the radical, wholly other of 
existing society denies difference in the sense of the contradictions and 
ambiguities of social life. We should neither dichotomize the pure and the 
impure into two separate stages of history, nor treat two kinds of social 
relations (authentic; inauthentic) as though society could move from one to 
another without transition. A liberating politics for change should conceive 
the social process developmentally, as one of evolution. We would in such a 
process move as a multiplicity of actions and structures which cohere and 
contradict, as we attempt to transition from the irrational what is 
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of existing society to the rational what could and perhaps should be in the 
world. The polarization between the impure, inauthentic society of today 
and the pure, authentic society we seek to institute detemporalizes the 
process of change. It does so because it fails to articulate how we move 
from one to the other. If institutional change is possible at all, it must begin 
by intervening in the contradictions and tensions of existing society. 
Moreover, no telos of any final ethical society exists. Rather, society 
understood as a moving and contradictory process implies that change for 
the better is always possible and always necessary. 
The requirement that genuine community embody face-to-face relations 
without a concomitant consideration for nonface-to-face relations, when 
taken as a model of the ethical society, carries a specific vision of social 
organization. Since the ideal of community demands that relations between 
members be direct and Janus-faced, the ideal society is composed of small 
locales, populated by a small enough number of persons so that each can be 
personally acquainted with all others. For most writers, this implies that the 
ideal social organization is decentralized, with small-scale industry and local 
markets. Each community aims for economic self-sufficiency, and each 
democratically makes its own decisions about how to organize its working 
and playing life. 
Again, I wish to be clear regarding the above. I question neither the 
desirability nor the preferability of small face-to-face, democratically 
34 
operated, decentralized communities, oriented toward economic self-
sufficiency, and political autonomy. I do not question the merit of such 
notions of community in which individuals have personal acquaintance with 
one another and interact in a plurality of contexts. The intimacy of living 
with a few others in the same household has unique dimensions that are 
humanly valuable; thus, existing with others in communities of mutual 
friendship and cooperation has specific characteristics of warmth and 
sharing that are to be valued. Furthermore, there is little question that 
capitalist patriarchal society discourages and destroys such communities of 
mutual cooperation, just as it squeezes and fragments families. But 
recognizing the specific value of face-to-face relations is quite a different 
matter from proposing them (in contradistinction to nonface-to-face 
relations) as the organizing principle of a whole society. 
Such a model of the ethical society which privileges face-to-face over 
nonface-to-face relations devalues the latter by diminishing the value of 
relations mediated through distance and time. This implied devaluation of 
nonface-to-face relations creates a problem which arises from the model of 
face-to-face community taken as a political goal. The model of the ethical 
society as usually articulated leaves completely unaddressed the question of 
how such face-to-face communities are to relate politically and socially to 
other face-to-face communities. This is a significant problem given the 
sense of diminished value with which the "ideal community" views all those 
35 
other face-to-face communities with whom they are not in direct, face-to-
face relation. 
Frequently, the ideal projects a level of self-sufficiency and 
decentralization which suggests that proponents envision few relations 
among the decentralized communities except those of friendly visits. But 
surely it is unrealistic to assume that such decentralized communities need 
not engage in relations of exchange involving resources, goods, and culture. 
Even if one accepts the notion that a radical restructuring of society in the 
direction of a just and humane society entails people living in small 
democratically organized units of work and neighborhood, this does not 
address the important political question: How will the relations among these 
communities be organized so as to foster justice and preclude domination 
between communities? And this is an especially significant problem in face-
to-face models of community, given the sense of diminished value with 
which such communities hold those others with whom they are not in face-
to-face relation. When we raise this political question the philosophical and 
pragmatic importance of mediation reemerges. The political must be 
conceived as involving social relations between friends, acquaintances, and 
strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate 
sense, and who relate necessarily across time and distance. 
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Chapter 6. Naturalism: Its Nonreductive Nature 
The first five chapters of this work have engaged in a Derridean 
deconstruction of an idealized notion of the ethical society often articulated 
by communitarian social and political theorists. This view of the ideal 
community privileges face-to-face relations without due consideration of the 
value of nonface-to-face relations. Moreover, it assumes that the face 
implied in these relations is not only to be privileged proximately, but is 
necessarily human. I develop in this and in succeeding chapters a 
philosophical basis in humankind for an ontological ethics of responsibility 
to the other, irrespective of the nature (human or nonhuman) or proximity 
(face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that other. I situate this ethics in what I 
refer to as an ontological relatedness to and with all that there is in nature or 
the cosmos. I claim that humankind is in the world, existentially, who and 
what it understands itself to be, ontologically, with respect to the depth with 
which it apprehends a sense of its ontological relatedness to all that there is. 
Furthermore, I discuss this sense-of-relatedness from two perspectives. 
First, I elaborate a philosophic naturalism to establish in humanity a basis for 
this sense. Second, I argue that this sense-of-relatedness may be construed 
as a religious sensibility. 
Naturalism, as a philosophic discourse, has multiple roots. It is in many 
ways an expression of characteristics that for centuries have certainly played 
a central role in American culture. Consider the influence of philosophic 
materialism, natural science, humanism, and "free thinking" in the period of 
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the American Enlightenment and the Revolution. 97 Yet naturalism also has 
roots in the history of Western philosophy as early as the classical Greeks, 
especially Aristotle. The Greeks were interested in what makes something 
what it is, in what causes events to happen as they do and objects to be as 
they are. 98 Plato gave one possible answer. The causes of things are ideal 
Forms, or universals, which in Plato's view exist independently of any 
events or objects and reside in their own "realm." 99 Aristotle agreed with 
Plato that there are ideal Forms that serve as causes of particulars, but he 
disagreed with Plato about their independence. Universals, Aristotle 
thought, do not exist independently of particulars, or, to put it another way, 
there is no "realm" of Forms outside or independent of nature.100 Aristotle 
further contributed to a naturalist perspective by arguing, unlike Plato, that 
Forms are not the only causes of things. In order to understand what causes 
an event or object one must also look to its relations with other natural 
events and objects. Specifically one must look to the material of which it is 
constituted and to what Aristotle called the efficient cause, the mediate or 
immediate agent of change.101 In Aristotle, not only were Forms brought 
into nature, but natural processes were accorded much greater significance. 
At the opening of the modem period, that is, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the most influential source for twentieth-century 
al. B h S . 102 H. . d . . ·1 f natur ism was aruc p1noza. IS Importance enves pnman y rom 
his rejection of Descartes' rigid distinction between material and mental 
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substance, and from his alternative view that there is in fact only one 
substance, which he interchangeably called "nature" or "God."103 This 
position expresses two distinctive traits of philosophic naturalism First, by 
referring to substance as God or nature, Spinoza rejected the distinction 
between nature and anything outside of nature, between the natural and the 
supernatural. Whatever exists is no more or less an aspect of nature than 
anything else. Or in Spinoza's own technical vocabulary, "substance has 
infinite attributes." 104 Second, in treating matter and mind as natural, as 
attributes of substance, Spinoza asserted the continuity of the mental and the 
physical; he claimed that both are available to the methods we have for 
inquiry into nature.105 
Finally, naturalism. and a good deal of the rest of twentieth-century 
culture, has its roots in the work of Charles Darwin.106 Darwin's theory had 
two general relevant implications. First, it undercut the view which had 
prevailed from antiquity into the middle of the nineteenth century; behind 
the changes in nature there had to be something fixed and finished, essences 
which themselves did not change.107 Second, and no less important, Darwin 
demonstrated by example that reliable knowledge of changing, developing 
nature is possible without recourse to eternal forms, without anything fixed 
and final.108 Aristotle had brought Plato's Forms down to earth; Darwin 
eliminated them altogether. 
From this brief account of its background in Western philosophy, in 
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American thought and culture, and in Darwin, we can begin to see some of 
the defining characteristics of naturalism. Among its distinguishing traits is 
its central philosophic category, or concept, of "nature." Naturalism holds 
that to one degree or another nature is objective. This means that it has 
characteristics the content of which is not solely determined by our opinions 
of them, by our perspectives on them, or by our knowledge of them.109 We 
have also already made the point that nature, following Spinoza, consists of 
whatever there is. Nothing, in other words, is "outside" nature; there is no 
supernatural realm, which is to say that literally nothing is nonnatural.110 
One of the implications, most significant for understanding human life and 
activity, of the view that there is nothing "outside" or "other than" nature is 
that naturalism does not endorse the traditional dichotomy between nature 
and human being. Human life, including its purposes, aims, meaning, 
value, and ideals, is wholly natural.111 The ramifications of this position are 
immense; it is so because it means that the meaning and value of our lives, 
and the ethical ideals on which we choose to act, have their source in nature 
and what is natural, not in the supernatural. As I will demonstrate in this 
work, it becomes an important project for naturalists like myself to ask how 
meaning and ideals might arise from human life, rather than descending 
from some external source of authority outside of, and heteronymous to, 
humanity. 
Naturalism generally, then, holds that whatever might be with respect to 
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reality is entirely an aspect of nature. Beyond this, however, there has been 
and remains considerable debate within the discourse of naturalism as to 
how nature might be understood, or about what nature is. On this question 
there have been three great traditions in the history of Western philosophy. 
The first, and traditionally the most influential, has been the view that nature 
is secondary to an independent supernatural realm of absolute truth and 
reality. This is the position first given detailed articulation by Plato, and it is 
the perspective that permeates mainstream European and American 
h . . h 1 112 Th d d" . . hi l" . h monot e1stic t eo ogy. e secon tra 1t1on wit n natura ism 1st at 
nature is wholly material in the sense that whatever might exist is reducible 
to or explainable in terms of matter and material processes. This view was 
found among the ancient Greek materialists (Thales, Anaximenes, 
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, etc.) and reappeared in Thomas 
Hobbes and again during the Enlightenment. It has had its proponents in the 
twentieth century, primarily in the English-speaking world.113 Naturalism's 
third traditional conception is that nature includes more than simply matter 
in motion, and whatever such nonmaterial aspects of nature are, they are 
neither reducible to matter nor explainable in material terms alone. This is 
the tradition that stems from Spinoza and in some respects from Aristotle.114 
The first, Platonic, approach to nature is actually not naturalistic at all; 
while the second and third are, at least in the sense that it is possible for 
them to refuse to acknowledge anything beyond nature itself. On these 
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grounds, naturalism could be said to include traditional, reductive 
materialism. Twentieth-century naturalism, however, has tended not to take 
this approach; it has for the most part fallen into the third category. Even 
here, though, two major strains of thought emerge. One is a form of 
materialism holding that while nature consists of material and nonmaterial 
phenomena, matter is the more fundamental in the sense that anything 
nonmaterial emerges from the material. This view is represented in the work 
of Roy Wood Sellars and to an extent by John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, and 
Sidney Hook.115 The other strain of thought might be called an 
epistemological pluralism holding that there is more to be found in nature 
than simply matter; yet it refuses to acknowledge any ultimate or 
fundamental primacy to any aspect of nature. This view is the more direct 
descendent of Aristotle, Spinoza, Randall, Buchler, and is to an extent the 
position embraced by the author of this work.116 
With respect to its conceptualization of nature, then, naturalism 
distinguishes itself in two crucial respects. The first, as we have already 
emphasized, is the rejection of anything other than nature. The other is that 
in both its "reformed" materialist (using Sellar's terminology) and its 
pluralist forms, naturalism pursues a conception of nature that avoids 
reductionism and rejects one of the traditional components of mechanical 
materialism: strict determinism. Naturalism, whether materialist or pluralist, 
are likely to regard nature as malleable; while natural processes are in some 
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respects determined, they are in other respects open. Nature can be 
described by both law and chance. 
Naturalism, therefore, need not be reductive if reductivism means 
. al f . al 117 s eqmv ence o any given property to a natur property. ome 
physicalists have explained how the physical, hence natural, properties of 
things might determine their other properties without being equivalent to 
them.118 This nomeductive determination, also called supervenience or a 
variety of it, is thus congenial with a high degree of holism and historicity.119 
A nomeductive naturalism can, therefore, combine a monism of entities--the 
natural ones of which everything is composed--with a pluralism of 
irreducible or emergent properties. Not everything is nothing but a natural 
thing; nor need naturalism be a totalizing philosophy that accords 
unconditional primacy to the natural face of existence. Indeed, naturalism 
from this perspective can regard the universe as having religious and moral 
dimensions that can enjoy aii important kind of primacy. So far from 
exhibiting "reptilian indifference" to human beings and their fate, the 
universe can be an enchanted place of belonging. This latter understanding 
of naturalism will be the view I take in articulating dialectical naturalism as 
an ontological basis for grounding ethics in humankind. 
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Chapter 7. Dialectical Naturalism: An Ethical Ontology 
What do we mean when we speak of nature? How shall we understand 
humankind in the context of nature? How should culture interact with 
nature? In the midst of social and ecological dysfunction, responding to 
these questions is of enormous import. These interrogatives are not esoteric 
philosophical queries born of metaphysical speculation. The denotations 
and ethical constructs with which we respond to these queries may 
ultimately decide whether humankind, individually as humans and 
collectively as society, will foster or truncate natural and social evolution. 
Upon initial inquiry, everyone seemingly understands what we mean 
when we speak of nature. It is, one might say, the biological and physical 
environment which surrounds us. Yet stating what is nature becomes more 
cumbersome when we include the human species as part of that which we 
construe as nature. Can we say that human society with its assortment of 
cultures and technology--including its various and often conflicting social 
ideologies and institutions--any less part of nature than that which we refer 
to as nonhuman nature? Moreover, if human beings are an integral 
component of nature, are they merely one organic entity among many 
others; or are they sui generis in ways that place fundamental obligations on 
them with respect to the balance of nature? Do these responsibilities so 
attach to humankind that no other aspect of nature (that we know of) may be 
held accountable for their assumption? 
Humankind, however, must become clear not only about "what we mean 
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by nature." We must develop clarity about who and what we understand 
ourselves to be (ontologically) with respect to nature; only then can we 
begin to determine in what ways (existentially), human beings are to be 
situated within nature and the relations with nature which ought to ensue. 
Unless we address this inquiry rationally--or at least more fully discuss it in 
the midst of public discourse--we will lack meaningful direction, ethically, 
in treating the social and ecological difficulties that plague us. Unless we 
become clear in our minds as to what we understand nature to be, 
ontologically, and how humankind (individually as humans and collectively 
as society) should relate within it and why, we will continue in our present 
cognitive muddle. Thought, word and deed will cohere neither into clarity 
of vision nor provide a rational basis for ethical relations which foster rather 
than impede natural and social evolution. 
This chapter develops a philosophical anthropology as a basis for 
grounding ethics in human ontology. The philosophical anthropology 
developed is both naturalistic and dialectical. It is naturalistic in that it 
construes (as did Spinoza) all that there is to be natural; it holds forth no 
conceptualization of that which is "other than" natural or supernatural. It is 
dialectical in that along with the hypothetico-deductive argumentation of 
analytical thought, so characteristic of Western consciousness, eductive 
reasoning is also employed. The chapter begins the discussion of the 
philosophical naturalism set forth by first explaining the eductive thought 
45 
process so basic to its logic. The text then discusses from whence it came, 
how it has been employed historically and finally, how it is utilized in the 
f d.al . I 1· 120 context o 1 ect1ca natura ism. 
There is a considerable body of literature dating back to classical Greece 
which provides the basis of an organic form of reason and a developmental 
interpretation of reality!21 With few notable exceptions, however, the 
Platonic dualism of permanence (i.e. identity) and change reverberated in 
one way or another throughout Western philosophy until the nineteenth 
century. It was at this juncture that Hegel's logical works largely resolved 
the paradox; he showed systematically that identity actually expresses itself 
through change. He articulated this development, to use Hegel's own words, 
as an elaboration of "unity in difference."122 The sweeping metanarrative in 
Hegel's effort has no equal in the history of Western philosophy.123 Like 
Aristotle before him, Hegel had an "emergent" interpretation of causality, of 
how the implicit becomes explicit through the unfolding of its latent form 
d "b"l' . 124 an poss1 1 1ties. 
On an enormous scale, the scope of which encompassed several extensive 
volumes, Hegel recorded what he viewed to be the essential categories by 
which reason elaborates reality; moreover, he educed them derivatively in an 
intelligible continuum that grades into a richly differentiated and 
increasingly comprehensive whole. 
The deductive reasoning of analytical thought, one might suggest, 
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consists of inferential "if-then" steps, with regard for logical consistency. 
This reasoning arrives at clearly stated propositions concerning what our 
sensory experience calls facts. Eduction, on the other hand, fully manifests 
and articulates the latent possibilities of phenomena. Eductive thought may 
be understood, therefore, as a phased process in which "if' is not a fixed 
hypothetical premise but rather a potentiality. "Steps" are not mere 
inferences to be deduced but phases of development. Furthermore, 
"consistency," is not the laws of logic based on principles of identity, 
contradiction, and the "excluded middle;" rather it is the immanent process 
we may more properly call self-development. Finally, "then" is the full 
actualization of potentiality in its rich, self-incorporative phases of 
development, differentiation, maturation, and wholeness. The "mature" and 
"whole," never so complete that they cease to be a potentiality for still 
further development, represent the eductive rationale for the ontological 
position advanced in this thesis with respect to dialectical naturalism.125 
One may construe eductive thinking, therefore, to be a developmental 
thought process directed toward an exploration of a potentiality's latent and 
implicit possibilities for being. This dialectical form of reasoning aims to 
understand the inherent logic of an entity's or phenomenon's development. 
It attempts to discern the point from which it began, where it is at present, 
and where by its immanent developmental logic it should (and perhaps 
could) proceed. Eduction thus attempts to render the latent possibilities 
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of a phenomenon fully manifest and articulated. Dialectical premises, 
however, are not random hypotheses; rather they are potentialities that stem 
from a distinct continuum, with a past, present, and latent future of their 
own. From these potentialities is educed or brought forth a graded 
differentiation toward wholeness--without dissolving the richly articulated 
phases that make up the whole into a vague, diffuse and unarticulated 
"oneness." 
The eductive process with respect to dialectical naturalism focuses on the 
transitions of a developing phenomenon which emerge from its potentiality 
to become fully developed and, thus, self-actualized. These transitions, in 
tum, arise through a process of "contradiction" between a thing as it is 
(reality in the context of the Hegelian Realitat), and a thing as it potentially 
should become (actuality in the context of the Hegelian Wirklichkeit).126 
The dialectical naturalism put forth in this thesis asserts that with the 
advent of a developmental transition of an entity or phenomenon, each new 
potentiality in a development cumulatively contains its previous phases, 
albeit transformed. For even as a new development--if and when it is fully 
actualized--an entity or phenomenon contains the potentiality to become a 
new actuality. The emergence of organic life out of inorganic nature is such 
a transition. Life not only emerges from the inorganic, it contains the 
inorganic within itself; yet, it is clearly more than the inorganic. Together, 
inorganic and organic nature constitute what one might call in the context 
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of dialectical naturalism, nonhuman nature. 127 The emergence of 
humankind and society out of nonhuman nature, in tum, is another such 
developmental transition. Thus, human society contains within itself the 
natural evolution of its own biological heritage. Yet society goes beyond 
biological (natural) evolution as such to manifest in what one may call social 
(cultural) evolution. This human social evolution, which this thesis terms 
human nature, expresses the natural continuity within nature of the 
development between natural and social evolution.128 
The cycle of human growth and development is, itself, an appropriate 
analogy of this eductive developmental process; it incorporates into itself a 
previous development out of which it arises. Thus the human adult does not 
simply replace the child he or she once was. Rather, the child is absorbed 
into and develops beyond the actualized potentiality of embryo, fetus, 
infancy and adolescence; moreover, barring accidents or genetic 
dysfunction, it is hopefully actualized further into a fuller, more 
differentiated adult being. Human development follows an eductive logic 
that is cumulative; it contains not only the child's biological (genetic) course 
of growth, but his or her social (epigenetic) development as well.129 
In examining the process of development, dialectical naturalism is 
especially interested inform and the manner in which organization occurs in 
inorganic and organic nature.130 Through its myriad forms of organization, 
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tensions or "contradictions" emerge in nature. In dialectical naturalism the 
tensions within nature are a dynamic process that impels self-development. 
Yet the dialectic of this naturalism is unlike other dialectical approaches 
which have regarded contradictions as abstractly logical (Hegel) or as 
determinately materialistic (Marx). Dialectical naturalism conceives 
contradiction as distinctly naturaI!31 The developmental potential in nature 
for actualizing what could (and perhaps) should be with respect to a 
phenomenon or entity is grounded neither in mind nor matter, exclusively. 
Rather, development in nature is eductive; it is open to the possibilities for 
bringing forth and thus actualizing what could and perhaps should be in 
nature. 
There is in an organic entity a tension between what that entity could 
potentially be when it is fully actualized (Wirklichkeit), and what it is at any 
given moment before that development is fulfilled (Realitat). That which an 
entity is constituted to become or "should be" (its actuality ) is implicit as a 
latent potential within that which it "is" (its reality)--the immediate explicit 
. . . . d 1 132 existence at a given moment m its eve opment. 
A thing or phenomenon in dialectical causality remmns 
unsettled, unstable, in tension--much as a fetus ripening 
toward birth "strains" to be born. because of the way it is 
constituted--until it develops itself into what it "should be" 
in al! its wholeness or fullness. It ca.'1Dot remain in endless 
tension or "contradiction" with what it is organized to 
become without becoming warped or undoing itself. It must 
. . t th full f 't be'. 133 npen m o • e .ness o i s mg. 
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The internal instability of contradiction impels a being or phenomenon 
toward self-development, whatever it should become, by virtue of the way 
its potentialities are constituted. Human development is instructive in this 
regard. Given the potentiality of a child to become an adult, there is a 
tension that exists between infancy, childhood, adolescence, and youth, until 
the child's capacities are fully actualized and manifest as a mature being. 
Certainly its development may be arrested or distorted during any one of 
these transitional phases. If a developmental distortion of what could and 
perhaps should be occurs we may say that what eventuates is less than a 
fully actualized--or in a sense (depending upon the type of dysfunction) a 
less than rational--perhaps even--"irrational"--human being. 134 Impelled by 
a dialectical logic (a process that includes its mechanico-chemical aspects, to 
be sure, in genes, chromosomes and the creation of proteins from nucleic 
acids), development proceeds. Yet the antecedent is preserved as 
actualization of potentiality occurs within the various stages of human 
development. These cumulative transitions of form from inorganic to 
organic ensembles produce an eductive continuity which contains the natural 
history of [a child's] development.135 
Dialectical naturalism, therefore, makes no attempt to efface dualisms 
like that of mind and body by attempting to conflate the former into the 
latter.136 Western culture, especially since Descartes, has conceived of such 
dichotomies as mind and body as radically separate from one another. 
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This rending, however, cannot be reconciled by simple reduction of one into 
the other.137 A human body without mind can hardly be understood to be 
conscious. Yet the mind-body distinction has some basis in human ontology 
in the context of the notion of emergent properties. 138 There are 
philosophers who contend that mind does emerge out of body as something 
distinct, even as it is part of and remains embedded in the body.139 Indeed, 
mind is a socially conditioned but organic differentiation of the body's own 
development as the evidence of natural evolution reveals.140 Dialectical 
naturalism moves beyond the mind-body debate. It does not reject the 
distinction between the two (reducing mind to body); rather it articulates the 
eductive development through which human consciousness (as nature 
rendered self-conscious) has evolved. The relationship between mind and 
body--their distinctness, as well as mind's dependence on and its origins in 
the inorganic and organic transitions of nonhuman nature alike--is a graded 
phenomenon. It is not one in which mind and body are rigidly separated into 
heteronymous dichotomies or collapsed into one another through simple 
reduction. 
We should not, however, in our discussion about dialectical naturalism's 
developmental logic confuse it with some sort of theory of reduction in 
which chemistry reduces or collapses into biology.141 Indeed, development 
in inorganic nonhuman nature has not been of precisely the same kind that 
we find in organic human and nonhuman nature. We are able to explain 
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many biological facts by means of chemistry. Yet the converse does not 
hold; we cannot explain the principles of chemistry by virtue of biology 
alone. The history of inorganic nature is a development of reactivity and 
interactivity; increasingly complex forms arise spontaneously from the 
interrelated effectivity which comprises the milieu of subatomic physics~42 
The history of human and nonhuman organic nature is, however, one of 
active development. Irrespective of how nascent the development, even the 
simplest unicellular organic forms are actively involved in maintaining their 
self-identity. They labor to prevent their dissolution into the inorganic 
environment surrounding them. Furthermore, this occurs even as these 
forms absorb from that immediately contiguous environment the inorganic 
and organic substances needed for their self-maintenance. In the 
evolutionary history of life-forms, nascent self-identity developed into more 
complex subjectivity and form. Moreover, even greater self-intentionality 
emerged as these life-forms maintained themselves, modified their 
environment, and rendered that environment more habitable. It is this 
elaboration of self-identity that distinguishes organic from inorganic 
development.143 Yet-despite this increasing subjectivity and intentionality of 
organic entities, an evolutionary continuity remains between the inorganic 
and organic aspects of human and nonhuman nature. At rudimentary levels 
of the intentionality of complex organic entities, we discern increasingly 
complex organizations of organic and inorganic compounds.144 
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There is wisdom in the claim of eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers 
like Denis Diderot. The differences, Diderot asserts, between the inorganic 
and organic worlds--and between the various organic entities--lie in what he 
II "h .. f ,,145 ca s t e orgaruzat10n o matter. 
Eductive, developmental reasoning such as that employed by Diderot had 
its origins in the logos concept of the Presocratic Greeks.1 46 Having 
survived in various forms through the millennia, it blossomed in the 
nineteenth century German Enlightenment and was elaborated most fully in 
its time by F.W.G. Hegel. In Hegel dialectical thought conceives of basic, 
seemingly contradictory logical categories--like "being" and "nonbeing"--as 
leading paradoxically to the category of "becoming."147 It was this latter 
category that, in the history of Western thought, dialectical logic takes as its 
seminal point of departure; it begins to differentiate becoming in the context 
of what it truly is--development. Becoming, with its wealth of logically 
educed categories in Hegel's logical works, is literally the cumulative history 
of pure thought~48 Dialectical reasoning in Hegel describes processes of 
cumulative change in which the logically prior is partly annulled, 
incorporated, and transcended by its synthesis as a new category. 
Hegel referred to the potentiality of a logical category as that which is 
implicit, or "in itself' (an sich); he referred to the more developed, articulate 
category emerging from it as the explicit, or "for itself' (fur sich). 
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Hegel designated the rational fulfillment of a potentiality as its actualization, 
or "in and for itself' (an undfur sich).149 Owing to its incompleteness or 
"contradictory" nature in the elaboration of the "whole," the implicit strives, 
in a sense, to fulfill itself by its own developmental logic. In similar fashion 
living forms in nature "strive" to grow and develop through the tension 
which exists between what they are at any given moment and what they 
should be in their maturity. The process by which the implicit potentiality 
becomes actualized explicitly is rendered in Hegelian terminology by the 
difficult-to-translate German word Aujhebung, sometimes expressed as 
"transcendence" or "sublation." In the Hegelian Aujhebung, the new 
category or phase of a development "contradicts" or "negates" the previous 
one, even as it ultimately incorporates it in a more complete condition.150 
It should be emphasized that contradiction in dialectical reason does not 
refer to a contradiction between two arbitrarily chosen statements which 
have no developmental relationship to each other. Rather, dialectical 
contradiction involves the fulfillment (entelechy) of a potentiality that 
negates the previous state, absorbs it, and goes beyond it It is not the 
juxtaposition of ideas or facts that patently have no connection with each 
other. 
In its Hegelian form, dialectics operates essentially within the realm of 
thought. Furthermore, Hegel's system invokes a speculative metaphysics in 
the context of an inexplicable cosmic spirit that culminates in a mystical and 
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infinite Absolute.151 Marx's historical dialectic of materialism, in tum, 
especially as developed by Frederick Engels, reveals a bias toward the 
relatively mechanistic science of the nineteenth century. We may recall that 
this materialistic science dealt more with Newtonian matter and motion than 
with any graded notion of inorganic or organic development of human and 
nonhuman nature.152 In contrast to either of these conceptualizations of 
dialectic, dialectical naturalism is completely informed by the developmental 
relatedness in nature in both its social (human-to-human) and ecological 
(human-to-nonhuman) contexts. Inorganic and organic development of the 
cosmos remains eductive but strictly naturalistic, without recourse to the 
Absolute Idealism of Hegel's Spirit (Geist) or the materialist narrows of 
Engel's mechanical kinetics. 
To dismiss dialectical reason because of the failings of Hegel's idealism 
and Engels's materialism, however, would be to lose sight of the coherence 
that dialectical reason can furnish and its applicability to social and 
ecological phenomena. This is particularly relevant in the context of an 
understanding of the cosmos rooted in evolutionary development. Despite 
Hegel's own prejudices against organic evolution, what stands out amidst 
the metaphysical and often theological archaisms in his work is his overall 
eduction of logical categories as the subjective anatomy of a developmental 
understanding of reality. What is needed is to liberate this type of reason 
from both the quasi-mystical and narrowly scientistic worldviews that in the 
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past have made it remote from the living world. We must separate it from 
Hegel's empyrean, basically antinaturalistic dialectical idealism and the 
stodgy, often scientistic dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxism. Shorn 
of both its idealism and its materialism, dialectical reason may be rendered 
naturalistic and conceived as a naturalistic form of thought. 
Dialectical naturalism, therefore, sees development as immanent in the 
cosmos or nature itself. Nonhuman nature alone, in all its wholeness, 
richness, self-creativity, and grandeur requires no "supernatural" to explain 
its being or processes. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, with its recourse to Geist, 
dialectical naturalism does not posit the presence of a spiritual principle in 
the cosmos; rather it sets forth nature's own self-evolving attributes to 
explain the existence of life and the inorganic and organic development from 
whence it came. Nor does dialectical naturalism postulate any metaphysical 
"Absolute," as Hegelian dialectics does, in which development is completely 
fulfilled, teleologically, eventuating in the "end of bistory."153 Rather, in 
dialectical naturalism nature or the cosmos remains open-ended with respect 
to its development and continually self-formative. It remains fluid, 
spontaneous, organic and free from the predeterminations present in the 
dialectical tradition which informs it. As a result, there is in dialectical 
naturalism an important sense in which being (including human being) 
consists largely of its own natural history; while mind or consciousness (as 
is true with all phenomena in a naturalistic dialectics) is understood as 
rooted both in nature and in history .154 
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As a way of reasoning about reality, dialectical naturalism is organic 
enough to give a more liberatory meaning to seemingly vague words like 
relatedness and wholeness without compromising intellectuality. It can 
answer the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: What do we 
mean by nature? How should we interact with it? How should our culture 
relate with nature? Equally important, dialectical naturalism adds an 
evolutionary perspective to the thinking process with respect to these 
questions. And this premise is valid despite Hegel's rejection of natural 
evolution and Engels's recourse to the mechanistic evolutionary materialism 
of a century ago. Dialectical naturalism discerns evolutionary phenomena 
fluidly; yet it does not divest natural evolution of rational interpretation. A 
dialectic that has been given a naturalistic core, and a truly eductive and, 
therefore, developmental understanding of reality provides the basis not only 
for an ontological ethics but of an ethical ontology of human being. 
Thus, the logic of dialectical naturalism suggests that natural history is 
the history of the emergence in nature or the cosmos of subjectivity, 
consciousness, and self-conscious mind. With respect to the logic of this 
history, dialectical naturalism argues the following premise. Irrespective of 
who or what we understand ourselves to be, ontologically, or how we live-
out that understanding through our way of being in the world, existentially, 
we are intra-related, developmentally, to all that there is in nature or the 
cosmos.
155 This logic, as I have herein suggested, attempts to grasp the 
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cosmos or nature as a developmental phenomenon, within and between its 
inorganic, organic and social realms.156 Organic phenomena undergo change, 
but more importantly, they undergo development and differentiation. They 
form and re-form their explicit reality of what is (Realitat), while actively 
maintaining their identity until, barring disruption, they actualize their 
potentialities for what could (and perhaps) should possibly be (Wirklichkeit). 
Since the cosmos, in the context of its evolution is eductively developmental, 
dialectical naturalism approaches nature as a whole from a developmentally 
. t l ted . 157 I . l . . . d 'al m ra-re a perspective. ts vanous rea ms--morgaruc, orgamc an soct --
remain distinct from each other; yet they grade into one another. 
The logic of dialectical naturalism, however, goes further than the intra-
related and graded development of inorganic, organic and social evolution. 
This logic further asserts that this developmental being-in-relatedness, as an 
ontological conceptual framework, implies otherness and, therefore, 
interrelatedness in the cosmos. Intentionality of consciousness, Brentano 
observed, is consciousness of something.158 In this regard Husserl's notion of 
intentionality is instructive.159 A conscious subject, he contends, is not 
something that first exists and then relates to things in the world. Rather a 
subject is a being which, inasmuch as it exists in the cosmos, is always already 
in the presence of an 'other', irrespective of the human or nonhuman nature of 
that other.160 
Moreover, being intra-relatedly of as well as in the cosmos is one of 
59 
effectivity: affecting and being affected by nature in both its human and 
nonhuman form. This ability of nature to affect and be affected by itself 
extends further the significance of the notion of interrelatedness within 
nature or the cosmos. Complex interactions occur both within and between 
human and nonhuman nature. This interrelated effectivity within nature 
may be conceptualized by briefly considering several theoretical constructs 
of what some have called the "new physics." 161 
The conceptual framework of the new physics (quantum theory, special 
relativity, etc.) supported by impressive volumes of experimental data, 
indicates that an observer cannot observe without affecting what he or she 
perceives. Observer and observed it seems are interrelated to and with each 
other in a real and fundamental sense. The exact nature of this interrelation 
is as yet not completely clear. There is, however, a growing body of 
evidence to suggest that the modem distinction between the "in here" and 
the "out there" is perhaps an illusion. 
Access to the cosmos (physical world) is through human experience. The 
common denominator of all experience is the "self" that does the 
experiencing. In other words, what we as humans perceive is not necessarily 
external reality in and of itself but our interaction (effectivity) with it. This 
view of our experience and thus capacity to affect and be affected by the 
world around us is the fundamental assumption underlying the scientific 
f l . 162 concept o comp ementar1ty. 
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At the tum of the century physicist Niels Bohr first developed the concept 
of complementarity to explain the paradoxical wave-particle duality of light. 
Wave-like as well as particle-like characteristics, he noted, are mutually 
exclusive, complementary aspects of light. Although the presence of one 
aspect always excludes the other, both are necessary to understand the 
properties and behavior of electromagnetic radiation (light). Wave- and 
particle-like behaviors are properties of our effectivity with it. Moreover, 
consideration of the properties that we usually ascribe to light, particularly in 
the context of our interaction with it, may by logical extension essentially 
deprive light of an independent existence apart from our effectivity of and 
with it.163 Without humankind or by implication anything else to interact 
with light, theoretically, may not "exist." Conversely, by extending the 
logic further, without light or by implication anything else to interact with, 
we may not "exist." As Bohr so cogently remarked, " ... an independent 
reality in the ordinary physical sense can be ascribed neither to the 
phenomena nor to the agencies of observation." 164 
By "agencies of observation," Bohr may have been referring to 
instruments, not people, perhaps. Yet philosophically, the notion of 
complementarity leads to the inference that the world consists not necessarily 
of independent things or objects, but of the effectivity of the cosmos--
manifesting nature's being-in-relatedness. The philosophical implications of 
complementarity become even more pronounced with the realization that the 
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phenomenon of wave-particle duality is a characteristic not only of light by 
itself, but by implication of all that there is in nature in both its human and 
nonhuman form.165 
A second way in which the new physics conceptualizes the thorough-going 
interrelatedness of nature or the cosmos is via the principle of uncertainty, 
first articulated in 1916 by Werner Heisenberg. The premise Heisenberg set 
forth states that we cannot with any degree of accuracy simultaneously 
measure both the position and the momentum of any subatomic entity in the 
universe!66 This principle reveals that as we delve deeper into the subatomic 
milieu of nature, we reach a certain point at which one part or another of our 
picture of nature becomes blurred; moreover, there appears to be no way to 
clarify one aspect of our perception without blurring another part of what we 
perceive. This is the salient point of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. At 
the subatomic level of nature, one cannot experience (observe) something 
without affecting it. There is no such thing as the independent, unrelated 
observer who can stand on the sidelines objectively observing nature (human 
or nonhuman) run its course without affecting or being affected by it. Thus, a 
fundamental inter-relatedness exists not only between human and nonhuman 
nature, but within human and nonhuman nature, respectively. The modem 
discourse reflecting the Cartesian distinction between the inside and the 
.d h b' . d h b. . h di . ted167 outSI e--t e o ~ectlve an t e su ~ective--appears to ave ss1pa . 
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Bohr's concept of complementarity and Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle together with Husserl's notion of intentionality of consciousness 
and the developmental basis of natural evolution discussed earlier, address 
an underlying fundamental relationality in nature between relatedness and 
consciousness. The emergence in nature of subjectivity and consciousness is 
an integral if recent part of the history of nature. The intentionality of this 
consciousness, as discussed previously, is consciousness of something--
consciousness of some human or nonhuman other. The Bohr and 
Heisenberg concepts suggest that, even at the subatomic level of existence, 
this something of which we are conscious may be understood as complex 
effectivity with or of that 'other,' irrespective of the nature (human or 
nonhuman) or proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that other. 
In my effort thus far to develop an ontological basis for grounding ethics 
in human responsibility, I have set forth the following premise. Irrespective 
of who or what we understand ourselves to be, ontologically, or how we 
live-out that understanding through our way of being in the world, 
existentially, we are intra-related, developmentally, to all that there is in the 
cosmos or nature. Moreover, I have suggested how this developmental 
intra-relatedness implies otherness in the cosmos. A subject is a being 
which, inasmuch as it exists in the cosmos, is always already in the presence 
of some 'other.' Finally, I have argued that being of and in the cosmos is 
one of affecting and being affected by nature in both its human and 
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nonhuman fonn. This capacity of nature to affect and be affected by itself 
gives rise to the notion of inter-relatedness in nature in the context of 
complex interactions. Given this social (human-to-human) and ecological 
(human-to-nonhuman) relationality of nature it seems appropriate at this 
juncture to suggest a correlation with ethics. Fostering the dignity and 
integrity of nature, in both its human and nonhuman form, appears to be 
predicated upon human nature's response in its social (human-to-human) 
and ecological (human-to-nonhuman) interactions. 
One may in the context of dialectical naturalism draw specific inferences 
with respect to these social-ecological engagements, and hence, to nature's 
ability to inter-relate with its own diverse, intra-related differentia and thus 
affect and be affected by itself. First, the development of human 
consciousness in the cosmos implies the emergence in nature of self-
consciousness. This nature rendered self-conscious means nature now has 
the ability to consciously affect its own natural and social evolution. A 
'response-ability' of such magnitude bespeaks a freedom in nature to be self-
determining concerning the path of its own natural and social evolution. It 
suggests as well a nature which is potentially self-realizing with respect to 
the possibilities for actualizing what could and perhaps should be in the 
world. Second, this response-ability in nature resides in human nature 
specifically; thus, it is humankind's self-conscious capacity to respond that 
obligates it (individually as humans and collectively as society) to 
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differentiate which responses serve the thrust of natural and social evolution 
and its tendency toward subjectivity, self-determination, and hence freedom, 
and which serve to impede it. Third, an intra- and inter-related nature 
rendered self-conscious has an ability to respond that constitutes nothing less 
than a responsibility to and with all others that is ontological--irrespective of 
whether that other is human or nonhuman, face-to-face or not. With human 
nature, therefore, rests the fundamental responsibility to be in the world in 
ways that foster (rather than impede) actualization of the latent, but no less 
real, existing potentialities for freedom and self-realization in nature. 
If we accept as valid the logic used in deriving the above inferences, 
several conclusions with respect to nature or the cosmos are ineluctable. 
Conceiving the cosmos as being constituted by ontological relatedness 
means that the development of human consciousness implies the emergence 
in nature of a conscious "response-ability" to be self-determining, self-
realizing, and thus potentially free to consciously determine the path of its 
own natural and social evolution. Moreover, because this response-ability in 
nature is manifest in human nature, this nature rendered self-conscious has 
an ontological and thus fundamental responsibility to and with all that there 
is. Human nature has, we may contend, an ontological obligation to be in 
the world in ways which foster rather than impede actualization of the latent, 
but no less real, potentialities for what could and perhaps should be in the 
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world. Furthermore, if nature rendered self-conscious is to actualize the 
latent potentialities within itself for what could and perhaps should be in the 
world, existentially, its aim should be one of bringillg to fruition natural and 
social self-realization concerning all others irrespective of the nature (human 
or nonhuman) or proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of its relations 
to or with those others. Human nature, in its being in the world, must 
endeavor to assume its ontologically-based responsibility to affirm and 
effect the dignity of all humankind in the context of a respect for, and the 
integrity of, nonhuman nature. 
Yet this should--this ought--remains unactualized although real in its 
potentiality in contemporary society. Thus the question arises. Why, in our 
social (human-to-human) and ecological (human-to-nonhuman) relations, 
are we frequently so disaffirming of each other and the world with whom 
and in which, respectively, we have our very being? 
Dialectical naturalism contends that to actualize the potentialities in 
nature and thereby fulfill the ontological responsibility of nature rendered 
self-conscious, human nature must bring to consciousness two critical 
understandings of itself. First, how we are in the world toward each other 
and the world around us is a function of who and what we understand 
ourselves to be. We must come to realize that we are in the world, 
existentially, who and what we understand ourselves to be with respect to 
the depth with which we apprehend a sense of our own ontological 
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relatedness to all that there is in nature or the cosmos. Second, this depth 
apprehension of reality with respect to who and what human nature 
understands itself to be, individually as humans and collectively as society, 
must be brought not only to self-consciousness, but to social-consciousnes, 
as well. This sense of ontological relatedness to all that there is in the 
cosmos must become in us (as nature rendered self-conscious) individually 
and collectively, a self-conscious appreciation for, and existential 
embodiment of, human nature's relatedness-based responsibility to and with 
all others. Moreover, the ontological basis of our relatedness to and with all 
'others' means that our responsibility exists as part of who and what we are. 
Finally, our responsibility exists irrespective of the context of our relatedness 
to that 'other' --whether as human-to-human, human-to-nonhuman, face-to-
face, or nonface-to-face. 
Thus far this work has deconstructed notions of an ethical society which 
privilege face-to-face, proximate and unmediated relationships. But it has 
done so only to the extent that they exclude or diminish the significance of 
nonface-to-face relations mediated by space and time as the basis of what 
should constitute ideal consociality. Moreover, it has argued for the need to 
establish, philosophically, a fundamental and concrete basis in humankind 
for ethical relations in society, rather than attempt to effect an ethic or 
idealized notion of community in the absence of such grounding. To this 
end this paper has put forth dialectical naturalism as an ontological basis for 
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ethical relations in society, centering the latter in the development of self-
consciousness and, hence, conscious response-ability in nature. Through 
this dialectic the work has attempted to develop the basis for an ethic of 
human responsibility, grounded in a sense of ontological relatedness to all 
others, regardless of the nature (human-to-human) or proximity (face-to-face 
or nonface-to-face) of that other. 
This text has made no attempt to establish what the "ideal ethical 
society" is. As noted early on in this work, exclusive of the caveats 
delineated in Chapters 2-6, there is much in the conceptualized notions of 
the "ideal community" with which the author agrees. What this text has 
sought to achieve is twofold. First, it has tried to articulate a reason why 
humanity should embrace any sense of ethics whatsoever with respect to 
each other (human nature) and the world in which we live (nonhuman 
nature). Second, the work has endeavored to provide a basis for grounding 
any sense of ethics within nature itself. It has attempted to ground it, in 
particular, within that aspect of nature rendered self-conscious--human 
nature. In the succeeding and final chapter this thesis will seek to document 
how the ontological relatedness previously discussed herein is not only a 
fundamental basis for human ethics but how our sense of that relatedness 
may be understood as a religious sensibility. 
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Chapter 8: Schleiermacher's God 
The preceding chapter set forth, philosophically, the need to become 
consciously aware of and embody our human sense-of-relatedness to all that 
there is in the cosmos. The present chapter will argue that this sense-of-
relatedness may be conceptualized as a religious sensibility. In this regard 
the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher is pivota1!68 The chapter will contend 
that Schleiermacher's conceptualization of the self-in-relation may be 
interpreted as an articulation of one's sense of ontological relatedness to all 
that there is in the cosmos, including that which is experienced as more than 
but not separate from the self, which Schleiermacher called, God. 
In what is a phenomenological consideration of the nature of the self, 
Schleiermacher advanced the thesis that the self exists in an immediate 
connectedness to that which is more than the self. What intrigues me about 
Schleiermacher's conceptualization is the absence of any heteronomy in the 
human relation to that which is more or more complex than the self which 
Schleiermacher expressed as God. 
Schleiermacher wrote and taught in Berlin with the thought of Kant in 
vogue. He embraced the Kantian caveat against speaking of 'knowledge' of 
God.169 As has been well noted, Kant's critiques of reason altered the course 
of subsequent Christian theology.170 With respect to the tradition within 
Protestantism which affirmed the Kantian argument, it would no longer be 
possible to reason from knowledge of the world to the existence of God.171 
Schleiermacher attempted to circumvent the prohibition by grounding 
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religion in an immediate awareness of God.172 In developing his thought, 
Schleierrnacher drew upon three primary influences. First there was the 
Platonism which had been instilled in him early in his life. There was also a 
certain fondness for Spinoza (whose thought spoke of the oneness of God 
and Nature). Finally there was the German Romanticism of his day in which 
0~1·al nn·1; 0 u J..a i;ved J..;. 11"f'e 173 "V~u l;e d1'rec•ly on the bo·o~ ~f' •J.. 0 
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infinite world," said Schleiermacher in his Speeches of 1799.174 Religion, 
for Schleiermacher, was to be conceived as "a life in the infinite nature of 
the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, a having and possessing all 
things in God, and God in all; ... a revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God 
be. · · -' · · ,..,od ,,l75 be l" . . I h . l mg seen m 1t ana it m u . To _ re 1g1ous Is to re ate t e part1cu ar 
to the whole, while the universal is immediately apparent in the particular.176 
The early work of Schleiermacher, especially his Speeches, was intended 
to be evocative. The aim through the use of language and imagery was to 
bring awareness to a certain sensibility in those who read it. It was, of 
course, directed to his German Romanticist acquaintances among whom he 
was the only declared cleric and Christian. Schleiermacher maintained that 
these "cultured despisers" of religion were in fact through their Romanticism 
intimately related in their thought to a religious consciousness. 
Schleierrnacher's approach was Socratic with respect to its objective. He 
wished to bring others to a certain self-appreciation, to allow them to 
70 
177 . h 
articulate what they in some way already haif sensed. Ai ihe time t e 
idea of religion had become mere affirmation of dogma--an assent to 
propositions which Schleiermacher regarded as no longer tenable. 
Schleiermacher grounded religion in human awareness--a radical thought. 
Yet this intellectual sojourn could not likely have occurred against a 
background other than that of German Romanticism. Romanticist interest in 
the subjectivity of human being and belief in the relatedness of the 
individual to the whole provided the intellectual context for this era's turn 
toward the subject and the latter's relatedness to all that there is.178 
In 1821/22 Schleiermacher elaborated The Christian Faith, systematically 
grounding theology anew. Faithful to the epistemological considerations of 
his era, he commences the effort from a consideration of the faculties (or 
basic capacities) of the human being. In his Speeches Schleiermacher had 
already denied that religion belongs to the sphere of knowledge.179 
Furthermore, he is scathing in response to Kant's assertion that religion is to 
be understood as a kind of appendage to morality.180 However 
Schleiermacher contends that we have a third faculty. We have, he says, a 
fundamental capacity for being in the world (analogous to Kant's aesthetic 
sphere); it is one of feeling or awareness which for him consists in an 
openness or receptivity towards the whole. It is to this sphere, 
Schleiermacher proposes, that religion rightly belongs.
181 
The opening comments of The Christian Faith, therefore, essentially 
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consist in a phenomenological description of what it is to be a self. In 
relation to all that there is in the world, Schleiermacher begins, we are 
conscious of a certain dependence and of a certain freedom.182 
Schleiermacher comments in regard to the human relation to parents and 
country; yet he continues there is equally as well the relation to the planets 
above: we both affect and are affected by the gravitational pull between us.183 
Schleiermacher contends that our distinct sense of freedom along with our 
distinct feeling of dependence, together constitute the dialectical relationship 
with the world which must always be for humankind. To this realm in 
which humankind is Schleiermacher appends the name--antithesis.184 
Yet quite apart from our relation with the world, we have, so 
Schleiermacher maintains, a sense of being simply dependent. It is this 
sense, he says, which we should understand by God.185 The claim here is 
that we experience ourselves as immediately derived; in this consciousness 
of ourselves we are aware that there is more than what we are. Furthermore, 
we have an immediate relatedness to that which is more than what we are. 
Schleiermacher articulates his sense of this in several ways. He speaks of 
our sense of "Whenceness," of Woher. 186 If we sense ourselves as Being 
(as Sein), it is also the case that we sense ourselves as having-in-some-way-
come-to-be, as Irgendwiegewordensein.187As I have already suggested, such 
a sensibility is not foreign to his era. German Romanticism conceived 
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of human being as fundamentally related to that which is more than the self. 
We must be clear, however. Schleiermacher is not putting fmward any 
sort of argument for the existence of God as though, given the nature of 
human self-consciousness, God were some kind of noumenal (or mental) 
"object" whose existence one could deduce.188The entire manner in which 
he goes about his argument, asserting that religion does not belong to the 
sphere of knowledge, speaks otherwise. Schleiermacher is well aware 
(having read Kant) that we could have no knowledge of such an "object." 
Rather we may say, speaking figuratively, that Schleiermacher's God is 
much "closer" to us than any such "object" could be. Our consciousness of 
God is present to us along with our experience of ourselves. 
Schleiermacher contends that the awareness, itself, is what we mean by 
God. 189 The issue is not whether this awareness implies God; we are not 
required, epistemologically, to get from the awareness itself to (a) God. 
Schleiermacher subscribes to no subjective argument which ostensibly leads 
one to believe in the existence of God. Even less does he subscribe to any 
notion of such a God as in some way set over against the self. Yet neither 
would Schleiermacher assert that God merely is within the self. Instead, in 
experiencing ourselves, we sense ourselves as immediately connected to that 
which is more than ourselves. It is the latter view which Schleiermacher 
means to connote with the expression, God.190 
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Hence, Schleiermacher conceptualizes no separation with respect to human 
being and its relatedness to God. The human self does not understand God 
as some object to be relegated to 'otherness.' Rather, Schleiermacher 
developed a notion of God faithful to both Kantian epistemology and the 
moral imperative of human free will. Any conceptualization of God in 
which there existed by necessity a separation with humanity was 
unacceptable for Schleiermacher. There can be, for Schleiermacher, no 
intimation that God is both other than what humankind is itself (i.e. set over 
against us) and yet the ground for our human relationship of absolute 
dependence. 
There existed for Schleiermacher, therefore, a two-fold task. He must 
distinguish how we are in relation to God from the relationship in which we 
are engaged with the world. He tells us that these relations may be 
differentiated qualitatively.191 In the context of our relationship to the world 
there is a reciprocity; we exist within the realm of the antithesis. God, 
however, is not an object with whom we interact. Rather, Schleiermacher 
might say, God is the presupposition of human being in the world. 
Heteronomy, therefore, can in no sense determine our human relationship to 
God. We have both freedom and autonomy, therefore, in our relation to the 
world. It is qualified only by the realization that we always exist in a 
reciprocal relation with all within the realm of the antithesis. The thrust of 
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Schleiermacher's position is that God can in no way be viewed as other than 
ourselves; God cannot qualify our relation to the world. God may be, 
perhaps, more than what human beings are individually, but humans exist in 
direct relatedness to God. 
As regards the identification of absolute dependence with 
"relation to God" in our proposition: this is to be 
understood in the sense that the Whence of our receptive 
and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, 
is to be designated by the word "God," and that this is for 
us the really original signification of that word. In this 
connexion we have first of all to remind ourselves that, as 
we have seen in the foregoing discussion, this Whence is 
not the world, in the sense of the totality of temporal 
existence, and still less is it any single part of the world. 192 
Again, Schleiermacher is categorical in his denial of God as in some sense 
an object for us. God is not a "given." This is what differentiates the 
relation to God from the human relation to all that there is within the realm 
of the antithesis. Schleiermacher's comments are cogent in this regard. "On 
the other hand, any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely 
excluded, because anything that is outwardly given must be given as an 
b. sed "nfl h l" h thi be " 193 o ~ect expo to our counter-1 uence, owever s 1g t s may . 
A crucial question to consider at this juncture is whether Schleiermacher 
supposes that the awareness of some Whence is a priori and thus prior to any 
expression of it. It is also critical to inquire whether this supposition is 
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requisite to his argument. There are those today, especially in the milieu of 
poststructuralist thought, who hold that there can be no experience (divine or 
otherwise) which is immediate and thus unmediated by language or 
concepts. In this regard Derrida has noted perceptively that there is nothing 
outside "the trace."194 
In responding to this query one should note that Schleiermacher does not 
suggest that that more complex awareness which is a God-consciousness 
exists independently of the relationship to the world. Rather such a God-
consciousness is different in kind. Schleiermacher may not maintain that 
consciousness of God is independent of our human relationship with the 
world. To do so would make God-consciousness unassailable and thus 
untenable for Schleiermacher. Such a position would fall victim to those 
who contend that there can be nothing beyond the trace of language and the 
experience of our perceptions.195 Schleiermacher, however, is clear on this 
point. Consciousness of God manifests itself solely within the context of our 
sensibly determined human self-consciousness. In The Christian Faith 
Schleiermacher makes clear his understanding. "For it is as a person 
determined for this moment in a particular manner within the realm of the 
196 
antithesis that [the person] is conscious of his absolute dependence." 
We see, therefore, that Schleiermacher's view precludes any 
conceptualization of a monadic self as though there can be a self in and of 
itself. A human self is not itself separate from God. Christian theologian 
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and interpreter of Schleiermacher, Richard R. Niebuhr, comments in this 
regard. "The fundamental thing that Schleiermacher has to say is 
[that] ... religion is an intrinsic element in the self-consciousness of the fully 
developed man."197 Schleiermacher understands the self to in some way 
open out on to that which is more than the self, but not separate from the self. 
The self is, in fact,truly itself only when it leads beyond itself. With this 
said, it logically follows that the self in Schleiermacher' s construct does not 
fall prey to Derrida's critique of "full presence."198 Schleierrnacher 
explains that in our experiences we have a sense of our being (as Sein); yet 
we also experience our having come to be (lrgendwiegewordensein). We 
sense ourselves, he says, as having posited ourselves, but equally as not 
having posited ourselves. 
If we are, however, in immediate relation to that which is more than we 
are, it is equally true that our self is determinate, and therefore free in 
relation to the world. We experience our being (Sein), the sense of having in 
some way posited ourselves. Again with Schleierrnacher, the human 
relationship to and with God will under no circumstances ever qualify the 
human relatedness to and with the world. God is not some other towards 
whom our relatedness is defined by separation; God is not some object which 
can ever limit our freedom in relation to the world. Schleiermacher 
experiences his relation to the world as free in the context of what must 
always be a reciprocal relation. Schleiermacher, therefore, experiences the 
77 
self both as having experienced limits within the world and thus as having a 
center to one's being, but also as having been posited and thus in-relation 
with respect to one's being. It is this sense of the self as both being centered 
and yet being in-relation that has much in common with dialectical 
naturalism's sense of ontological relatedness in the context of human nature. 
Dialectical naturalism's conceptualization of the self-in-relation following 
on the thought of Schleiermacher suggests that we may wish to speak of an 
immediate presence to another through what those with a religious sensibility 
might call prayer or deep meditation; moreover, we may indeed wish to 
conceive of God as that through which we may be present to another in such 
a way. In doing so the distinction between the nature of our human relation 
to God and our relation to some other begins to dissipate. Herein lies the 
basis for beginning to understand dialectical naturalism's sense of 
ontological relatedness as a religious sensibility. 
The way in which this thesis is suggesting that we reconceptualize our 
understanding of self (and God) leads ineluctably to an emphasis on human 
responsibility. The issue becomes one of how humans may be in touch with 
their deepest selves (i.e. with that which is God in them) so that they may 
come to deeply apprehend a sense of their own ontological relatedness to that 
which is more or more complex than the self but not separate from it. 
The classical conception of God credits humans with autonomy and 
responsibility only at the expense of divorcing God and "the good" from 
78 
human nature. By contrast, the way in which this paper is conceiving of 
God suggests that God, as that which is more or more complex than the self 
but not separate from the self engages the process of persons coming to 
themselves. As has been mentioned previously in this work, Kant's sense of 
intrinsic order is helpful in this reconceptualization of God as that which is 
more or more complex than but not separate from the self. Kant, it should 
be remembered, believes that human beings should understand their ethical 
responsibility to exist within a wider framework such that right acting is 
validated. 
Schleiermacher' s God, therefore, far from being a kind of object or other 
which is removed from the world, is closer to us than any such "object" 
could be. By returning to our selves through self-reflexive thought humans 
can begin to understand that our being-in-this-world opens out on to that 
which is more or more complex than we are. But given the context of the 
period in which he wrote, Schleiermacher understandably did not pursue the 
logic of his exceptional insight--that religious sensibilities are intrinsic to 
nature. Moreover, he did not see that this is particularly true with respect to 
that part of nature which has been rendered self-conscious--human nature. 
Extending the logic of Schleiermacher's position, dialectical naturalism 
suggests that in being ourselves most completely we humans experience in 
the world that which Schleiermacher called God. By implication this 
realization carries with it the need to overcome the dichotomies fundamental 
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to the major theological tradition of Western civilization: Gcxl's power is at 
the exclusion of our own; Gcxl's gocxlness thrusts humanity into fallenness. 
Dialectical naturalism conceives of Gcxl as the actualization of the 
potentialities in the cosmos (with respect to what could and perhaps should 
be in human and nonhuman nature), if also more or more complex than what 
we humans are individually and perhaps collectively. Given such a 
conceptualization of self and Gcxl, there remains no longer a basis for 
construing reality hierarchically. Moreover, we can move beyond 
heteronymous relationships within our social (human-to-human) and 
ecological (human-to-nonhuman) relations. We can dismantle hierarchical 
conceptions of reality which includes what Mary Daly and other post-
Christian theorists suggest is the patriarchal God of the Judeo-Christian-
Islamic tradition.199 We need tolerate no further the fragmentation of 
human nature. We need no longer project a Gcxl in apposition to who and 
what we ourselves are and remain psychologically separated from a sense of 
our own human ontology. 
Thus the conceptualization of that religious sensibility of being 
ontologically related to that which is more or more complex than but not 
separate from ourselves, to which we append the name "Gcxl," is integrally 
and intimately tied to human ethics. Irrespective of the conception of God 
that one may develop, it must henceforth be in accord epistemologically 
with what we know, scientifically, about the nature of the universe, and 
ethically with what is morally tenable. Toward this end dialectical 
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naturalism endeavors to develop a basis for beginning to talk about such an 
epistemology and ethics through its conceptualizations of self, other and 
God. Moreover, it develops a rational basis for grounding ethics in human 
nature. It articulates a rational conceptualization for understanding 
humankind to have an ontological responsibility commensurate with its 
response-ability as nature rendered self-conscious and, thus, self-
determining with respect to its own natural and social evolution. Dialectical 
naturalism contends that to accomplish this humanity must come to deeply 
apprehend its human nature; we must begin to develop a sense of our 
ontological relatedness to all that there is. We must come to appreciate that 
individually as humans and collectively as society we are in the world, 
existentially, who and what we understand ourselves to be with respect to 
the depth with which we apprehend a sense of our own ontological 
relatedness to all that there is, including that which is more or more complex 
than we are, but not heteronymous to us. 
If we are ever to create an ethical society, face-to-face, decentralized 
notions of community will almost certainly play a role in their development. 
But this will not likely be accomplished unless the ideas from which these 
notions are drawn can themselves be shown to have congruency with and 
grounding in an epistemology, ethics, as well as conceptualizations of self 
and God such as that elaborated by dialectical naturalism. The author sees 
little alternative to developing a notion of ethics which conceptualizes the 
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natural history of the self as including the other (without, of course, 
consuming or being subsumed by that other) irrespective of the nature 
(human or nonhuman) or proximity (face-to-face or nonface-to-face) of that 
other. Dialectical naturalism provides an ontological basis for just such an 
ethics: developing as it does an understanding of the self as centered-in-
relation as well as the need to embrace and embody a sense of this 
relatedness to all that there is which includes that which is more or more 
complex than the self but not separate from the self, whose power in prayer 
or meditation we draw on and many name--God. 
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